What is Moral Naturalism?
Or, is Nature good or bad?
One of the weirdest moments in the history of the West is the period from about 1500–1700, when people had become super scientific but hadn’t yet discovered democracy. This is the period in which Newton thought he was revealing God’s plan for Earth. In other words, this is the period after the Enlightenment but before the French Revolution. During this period, “nature” was the primary moral text for understanding society. It is no surprise that the idea of “natural rights” then emerges during this time.
Whether referred to as the “reading-off hypothesis” or just naturalism,” this is the idea that we can both better describe or explain human society by applying the knowledge derived from the study of the nonhuman world since we are also part of nature, a particular species of animal. This was predicated on three intoxicating propositions: there is a natural order with a corresponding natural law; this natural order can be seen in the rest of nature; and humans ought to follow this natural order.
In many ways, it was literally just differing readings of nature that set in motion the major philosophical cleavages between Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. For instance, Thomas Hobbes saw nature as “solitary, poor, nasty,” and thus security and a strong sovereign were vital for a good society; for Locke, nature was not yet good enough, and thus the improvement of nature by humans was a marker of every good society, thus private property was needed and indigenous lifeways were inconceivable; and for Rousseau, nature was itself good, savages were noble, and civilization was a corrupting force. All their philosophizing about what makes a good society and good politics flows from these basic readings of nature.
More recently, G.E. Moore has called this the “naturalistic fallacy,” which is how a lot of people know it. It might be a logic fallacy, but that doesn’t mean it isn’t still important to our politics today.
The legacy of naturalism is still with us today. In his book Moral Politics, George Lakoff distinguishes between two moral frameworks that guide political thinking: the "strict father" and the "nurturant parent." These two ideas about parenting and the role of the state, he says, come from two basic readings of (human) nature and more than anything else reflect the unspoken moral cleavages between the Republican (strong-father) and Democratic (nurturant parent) Parties today. Again, this is the same fucking cleavage that split Hobbes on one side and Locke and Rousseau on the other.
On the one hand, the "strict father" morality emphasizes obedience to authority, discipline, and self-reliance and is often associated with conservative political values. On the other hand, the "nurturant parent" morality emphasizes empathy, nurturing, and responsibility to others and is often associated with progressive political values. According to Lakoff, these moral frameworks are deeply ingrained in our brains and are a result of our upbringing and cultural experiences. The "strict father" framework is based on a hierarchical, top-down structure, while the "nurturant parent" framework emphasizes collaboration, mutual aid, and care.
The ambivalence of the term “wilderness” reflects the moral ambivalence of nature. Wilderness is defined as “an uncultivated, uninhabited, and inhospitable region,” “a neglected or abandoned area of a garden or town,” or “a position of disfavor, especially in a political context.” It is “not a luxury but a necessity of the human spirit,” and “the wilderness had a clarity that included me,” and “belonging so fully to yourself that you’re willing to stand alone is a wilderness—an untamed, unpredictable place of solitude and searching,” whatever.
In his famous Wilderness in the American Mind, Nash wrote that "the values that Americans associate with wilderness—freedom, freshness, uniqueness, contrast—form a cluster of abstract concepts, a mythic construct, that derives its power from the particulars of experience. This myth is deeply ingrained in our culture and conscious mind. It is sustained and reinforced by a wide spectrum of institutions, and we are all implicated in its creation and maintenance."
The problem with naturalism is that it only works if we maintain that we are totally separate from nature. Otherwise, if we take for granted that nature is everything, within “everything” there is war, genocide, rape, and so on. In this way, nature ultimately flattens all voltage between moral poles. Morality thrives on binary opposition, which is why the idea of wilderness as a distant place out there somewhere works for moral sensibility.
I wonder if we don’t think about nature enough.